God’s foreknowledge is incompatible with genuine human freedom

Here are two statements that I consider a truth of crystal clear self-evidence:

Axioms of God’s Foreknowledge vs. Human Freedom 

God’s total foreknowledge is incompatible with genuine human freedom.

God is with us at all times but does NOT know in advance what we'll think or do.

Having stated my “Axioms of God’s Foreknowledge vs. Human Freedom”, I have gradually realized that what is for me self evident, and therefore axiomatic, is not so for many people. This is so, I suspect, in particular for Protestant Christians, in particular of Calvinist ascent. Anyway, I realize that it is necessary to demonstrate what to me is obvious, either directly, or by disproving the opposite, viz. the position that is referred to as "compatibilism", that is:

God’s total foreknowledge is compatible with genuine human freedom.

A typical example can be found in this article by Norman Swartz, Foreknowledge and Free Will @ The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

You can read the article, in detail, for yourselves. At some point it gets rather technical, and requires a certain familiarity with Symbolic Logic.
 
I will only concentrate on the essential for my present purpose. The author of the article, Norman Swartz (professor emeritus of philosophy, retired 1998, Simon  Fraser University) gives immediately the clearest possible formulation of the problem, the one that goes back in the 12th century and to the Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides:

… "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect. …"
(The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics [Semonah Perakim]), edited, annotated, and translated with an Introduction by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, pp. 99-100, New York: AMS Press, 1966)

The objection of Norman Swartz to the validity of Moses Maimonides’ statement has been summed up by saying that what Norman Swartz affirms it is vitiated by a logical fallacy, the modal fallacy.
 
Logical Symbolism
   
To examine the objection that Norman Swartz raises against Moses Maimonides, one has to become familiar with some logical symbolism used in his paper:
   
P, Q, R, ... are  propositions, that is objective statements (see note #3 in Swartz’ paper)
   
  ~P: it is not the case that P (Example: It is not the case that copper conducts electricity. Note: "P" and "~P" have opposite truth-values – whichever is true, the other is false.)
   
  P > Q: if P, then Q (Implication. Example: If she is late, (then) the meeting will be delayed.)
   
  gKP: God knows that P (Example: God knows that the Mississippi River flows north to south.)
   
  ◊P: it is (logically) possible that P (Example: It is (logically) possible that the United States was defeated in World War II. (Note: Whatever is not self-contradictory is logically possible.)
 
  ☐P: It is (logically) necessary that P (Example: It is logically necessary that every number has a double. (Note: If Q is not logically possible, then ~Q is logically necessary.)
 
  ∇P: It is contingent that P (Example: It is contingent that the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. (Note: A proposition, Q, is contingent if and only if Q and ~Q.)
 
  ∴: it necessarily follows (It is the conclusion, viz. the proposition that follows logically and necessarily follows one or more propositions that are called premises. The conclusion is at the bottom, separated from the premises by a horizontal line   ____ )
_______
  
Swartz’ exam of Maimonides’ argument and (presumed) modal fallacy
  Herebelow I have copied entirely form his paper, Swartz’ exam of Maimonides’ argument and (presumed) modal fallacy  (see 6b. The Modal Fallacy in Epistemic Determinism

Let's recall Maimonides's argument:

… "Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that [that] man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect."

We can symbolize the core of this argument, using "∴" for "it necessarily follows"; and "☐" for "compelled" [necessitated]; and "D" for the proposition describing what some particular person does tomorrow.
 
  gKD  [“God knows what a particular person will do tomorrow”]
  ____ [“implies that”]
  ∴☐D [“it necessarily follows what that particular person will do tomorrow]
 
  There seems to be (at least) one missing premise. [In the terminology of logicians, the argument is enthymematic.] One tacit assumption of this argument is the necessary truth, "it is not possible both for God to know that D and for D to be false", or, in symbols, " ~ (gKD & ~D)". So the argument becomes:
 
  gKD  [“God knows what a particular person will do tomorrow”]
  ~ (gKD & ~D) ["it is not possible both for God to know that D and for D to be false"]
  ____ [“imply that”]
  ∴☐D [“it necessarily follows what that particular person will do tomorrow]
 
  But even with this repair, the argument remains invalid. The conclusion does not follow from the two premises. To derive the conclusion, a third premise is needed, and it is easy to see what it is. Most persons, with hardly a moment's thought, virtually as a reflex action, will tacitly assume that the second premise is logically equivalent to:
 
  gKD ⊃☐D [“If God knows what a particular person will do tomorrow, then what that person will do tomorrow is (not contingent but) necessary”]
 
  and will tacitly (/unconsciously) add this further premise, so as to yield, finally:
 
  gKD  [“God knows what a particular person will do tomorrow”]
  ~ (gKD & ~D) ["it is not possible both for God to know that D and for D to be false"]
   gKD ⊃☐D [“If God knows what a particular person will do tomorrow, then what that person will do tomorrow is (not contingent but) necessary”]
  ____ [“imply that”]
  ∴☐D [“it necessarily follows what that particular person will be compelled to do tomorrow”]
 
  [Swartz’ conclusion]
 
  But this third premise, we have seen above, is false; it commits the modal fallacy. Without this premise, Maimonides' argument is invalid; with it, the argument becomes valid but unsound (i.e. has a false and essential premise [viz. the third one]). Either way, the argument is a logical botch.

  Once the logical error is detected, and removed, the argument for epistemic determinism simply collapses. If some future action/choice is known prior to its occurrence, that event does not thereby become "necessary", "compelled", "forced", or what have you. Inasmuch as its description was, is, and will remain forever contingent, both it and its negation remain possible. Of course only one of the two was, is, and will remain true; while the other was, is, and will remain false. But truth and falsity, per se, do not determine a proposition's modality. Whether true or false, each of these propositions was, is, and will remain possible. Knowing – whether by God or a human being – some future event no more forces that event to occur than our learning that dinosaurs lived in (what is now) South Dakota forced those reptiles to take up residence there.

  Criticism of Swartz’ criticism of Maimonides’ (presumed) modal fallacy
 
  I have no objection concerning Swartz’ analysis of Maimonides’ argument, and on the "implicit premises" that Swartz extracts from Maimonides’ argument.

It is Swartz’ conclusion that, far from exposing Maimonides’ argument (complete with the three explicit premises) as “unsound” and as a “logical botch” emphasizes Swartz’ own fallacy, in the case of God.
 
  Swartz affirms that the “third premise” (symbolically  gKD ⊃☐D, viz. “If God knows what a particular person will do tomorrow, then what that person will do tomorrow is (not contingent but) necessary”, is false and essential, because … “Inasmuch as its description was, is, and will remain forever contingent, both it and its negation remain possible.”
 
  Now, while all the above is, from a strictly logical POV, impeccable, I affirm that it cannot apply to God, if God is considered totally omniscient  and omnipotent, and that, in fact,  contrary to what Swartz says, in the case that God is considered totally omniscient  and omnipotent, the “third premise” is essential AND true, because, if it wasn’t, then God would be either NOT omniscient, OR NOT omnipotent, OR both.
 
  An example will be sufficient to show that Mt. Swartz'  mountain is nothing but a molehill. 

 

D: God foreknows that the the Sheriff Pat Garret will shoot and kill the bandit Billy the Kid, at age 21, in Fort Sumner on July 14, 1881
  

If Billy the Kid escapes death, then God is NOT Omniscient. Or he is NOT Omnipotent, because he did not "steer" events so as to make them correspond to His foreknowledge. 

 

Q.E.D.

Basil in search of the hypostasis

No, its not Basil with the Arab Phoenix, but Ahmed with a Bald Ibis ...

Basil of Caesarea (ca. 329 - 379) was the Greek bishop of Caesarea Mazaca in Cappadocia. His brother was Gregory of Nyssa. With Gregory of Nazianzus, the three are collectively referred to as the Cappadocian Fathers.  

Some time ago, in his blog Eclectic Orthodoxy,  Fr Aidan (Alvin) Kimel wrote a post by the title St Basil the Great and the Search for Hypostasis (14 July 2013). 

Here are my notes of comment and criticism. (I suggest that, first you read Fr Aidan's post.) 

Fr Aidan Kimel obviously is an apologist, more, an enthusiast of the Cappadocians. I think they are possibly the worse thing that could happen to Christianity at the most critical time, so much so that I prefer to call them the Cappadocian scoundrels, for the mischievousness of their deeds, viz. concocting the doctrine of the (co-equal, co-eternal, tri-personal) Trinity, which, with good peace of deluded advocates, was and is nothing but a political ploy, designed to reconcile, after some 60 years of strife, the (neo) Nicenes with the (semi) Arians. Sadly for Christianity, they succeeded.

In his post, Fr Aidan says that in 377 CE Amphilochius of Iconium wrote to St Basil and asked him to explain the distinction between ousia and hypostasis. Basil responded with a statement that Fr Aidan reproduces in his post, from Basil's Letter 236 §6. 

N.B. Fr Aidan Kimel's quotation does not include the end of §6, perhaps because it was not included in his source (John Behr, Nicene Faith, II, p. 298), perhaps because the omitted part would have been rather embarrassing. Here is the quotation of the omitted part of §6:

On the other hand those who identify essence or substance [ousia] and hypostasis are compelled to confess only three Persons [prosopa], and, in their hesitation to speak of three hypostases, are convicted of failure to avoid the error of Sabellius, for even Sabellius himself, who in many places confuses the conception, yet, by asserting that the same hypostasis changed its form to meet the needs of the moment, does endeavour to distinguish persons [prosopa].  (“Basil the Great on Ousia and Hypostasis”, Letters, 236. 6  @ earlychurchtexts.com; St. Basil of Caesarea, Letter 236 @ newadvent.org)

The above quotation shows how difficult it was, even for Basil of Caesarea, to replace prosopon with his his new-found pet word, hypostasis.

Anyway, Basil may try as much as he likes to explain the difference between hypostasis and ousia to a perplexed Amphilochius of Iconium. The fact remains that those definitions are entirely his invention, without the faintest basis in Aristotle and in previous usage. So much so that John Behr “suggests that Basil is working with the distinction proposed by Aristotle between primary and secondary substance”. By this, John Behr adds to the confusion, because, the “particular or individual substance” (say, Paul, or Timothy, or Silvanus) is precisely what Aristotle refers to as “primary ousia” whereas the “given essence” is precisely what Aristotle refers to as “secondary ousia” (for instance, man).

Athanasius was perfectly aware of this abusive use of hypostasis by the Cappadocians, so much so that he continued to refer to God as "one substance" mia hypostasis.

Around the Synod of Alexandria of 362 (see Socrates Scholasticus > Church History, Book III, ch. 7-8), the Latins tried to translate the Cappadocian formula ena ousia en treis hypostaseis with una essentia in tribus substantiis, and they were horrified, because they perceived it as tri-theistic, through and through.

So as to stop being scandalized, the Latins had to invent a new word to replace substantia, as a translation for hypostasis: subsistentia. But, as the Online Etymological Dictionary appropriately says,

“Latin subsistentia is a loan-translation of Greek hypostasis, "foundation, substance, real nature, subject matter; that which settles at the bottom, sediment," literally "anything set under."” [entry subsistence]

In the concluding remark of his post St Basil the Great and the Search for Hypostasis, however, Fr Kimel is honest enough to admit: 

“I must note that my language in the last two paragraphs reflects later Church usage. For Basil, as for Jesus and the Apostles, the one God is the Father.”

Unfortunately, this is precisely the problem with Eastern Orthodox Christianity: whether they are aware of it or not,  they have never let go of (a certain amount of) Subordinationism.

Still not convinced that the Eastern Orthodox understanding of the Trinity is ultimately Modalistic Monarchianism?  Then read what Fr Kimelwrites, just before the previous admission:

"The only difference between the Three is how each is the one God—not a difference in substance but of mode of existence." (St Basil the Great and the Search for Hypostasis, cit. - emphasis added)

Justin Martyr’s "original sin" of "another God and Lord"

Although Justin did not actually use the phrase "second God" (Gr. deuteros theos) in reference to Jesus,  he did use a couple of equivalents: "another God and Lord" (Gr. theos kai kurios eteros), holding "second place" (Gr. deutera chōra). Here are the relevant references:

Then I replied, “I shall attempt to persuade you, since you have understood the Scriptures, [of the truth] of what I say, that there is, and that there is said to be, another God and Lord [theos kai kurios eteros] subject to the Maker of all things; who is also called an Angel, because He announces to men whatsoever the Maker of all things — above whom there is no other God — wishes to announce to them.” (Dialogue With Trypho, ch. LVI – emphasis added)

Our teacher of these things is Jesus Christ, who also was born for this purpose, and was crucified under Pontius Pilate, procurator of Judaea, in the times of Tiberius Caesar; and that we reasonably worship Him, having learned that He is the Son of the true God Himself, and holding Him in the second place [deutera chōra], and the prophetic Spirit in the third, we will prove. For they proclaim our madness to consist in this, that we give to a crucified man a place second to the unchangeable and eternal God, the Creator of all; for they do not discern the mystery that is herein, to which, as we make it plain to you, we pray you to give heed. (First Apology, ch. XIII (see also ch. LX) – emphasis added)

Could Justin Martyr’s "original sin" of "another God and Lord", the continuing sin of Subordinationism, the crisis of Arianism, be cured with a pharmakon other that the Trinity? Which doctrine of the Trinity snapped the Hellenistic "chain of being", true, but at the cost of enveloping Christianity in esoteric mystery? Yes, it could. Marcellus of Ancyra had already started administering it at Nicea. Unfortunately the Arians raised their head, unfortunately the Eusebians took advantage of the confusion, to try and restore the previous subordinationist status quo, unfortunately the Cappadocians scoundrels, with the guilty assent of Athanasius, invented a remedy (the co-equal, co-eternal, tri-personal Trinity) that is worse than Justin Martyr’s "original sin", and which can only be put right by disposing of it for good.

Who is the "one Lord", for Paul?

In Ps 110:1, in Hebrew, the One and Only YHWH is contrasted with 'adôni (“my lord”). In the LXX translation, we find ho kyrios contrasted with ho kyrios mou. So this is perfectly in line with the usual LXX translation of YHWH with ho kyrios. The key word, for both versions, is: contrasted. However, and unlike Ps 110:1, Paul, in 1Cor 8:6, refers to Jesus as eis kyrios (“one lord”). Exactly as Deut 6:4 refers to the One and Only God, not only in the LXX translation (kyrios eis), but also in the original Hebrew (YHWH 'echad). Now, unless one is ready to resort to the desperate gambit of affirming that there is a (significant) difference between eis kyrios (1Cor 8:6) and kyrios eis (Deut 6:4 – LXX), the two expressions are essentially one and the same.

One may say that what is important about 1Cor 8:6 is the context of the whole chapter 1Cor 8, where Paul speaks to the Corinthians about the right attitude to take regarding the food sacrificed to idols. As is known, Paul had a rather "liberal" attitude about the issue, with the only limit that those who are "stronger" should not cause scandal to those who are "weaker" and have scruples.

But the text of 1Cor 8:6 cannot be treated lightly: Paul speaks as though the One God (eis theos, the Father) had entirely transferred the title and role of One Lord (eis kyrios, that is the same role that is esclusive to YHWH in Deut 6:4 – LXX) to His resurrected, ascended and glorified Son, Jesus Christ.

Certainly Paul caused scandal among the Jews, and in particular the Judaeo-Christians of Jerusalem, by not imposing the Mosaic Law on Gentile Christian converts. In fact, Paul's "liberal" attitude towards the Mosaic Law was so extensive, that he went as far as affirming that ...

Circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing. Instead, keeping God’s commandments is what counts. (1Cor 7:19)

But I suspect that Paul's affirmation that (the resurrected, ascended and exalted) Jesus Christ was (had become?) eis kyrios was considered by the orthodox Jews Paul’s peculiar heresy. 

Maimonides: more than perplexed about the Trinity

There cannot be any belief in the unity of God except by admitting that He is one simple substance, without any composition or plurality of elements: one from whatever side you view it, and by whatever test you examine it: not divisible into two parts in any way and by any cause, nor capable of any form of plurality either objectively or subjectively. (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed 1.51)

I find it the epitome of irony that the great Rambam is enlisted by some Trinitarians in defense God's unity, as though he hadn't also severely condemned the "mystery" of the Trinity.

Here is what he wrote, elsewhere:

When the master of the prophets [Moses] intended to to inform us us that Almighty God is One, and that there is no second unto Him, and to remove from our minds [lit. "erase from our hearts] the false view of the dualists [Hebrew: mishniyim from sheney meaning two, i.e., those who believe im two gods], he clearly stated the following fundamental principle: Hear o Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is one [Deut. 6:4]. The Christians cite this Biblical phrase as proof of their contention that God is three, in that they assert: it is stated the Lord, and it is stated the our God, and it is stated the Lord, there are thus three names; [sic!], then it is stated  One, proving that they are three and that the three are one. Heaven forbid! [I.e. may God preserve us from such false and evil interpretations of Scripture]. (Moses Maimonides' Treatise on Resurrection, pp. 21-22)

Maimonides, in the very same paragraph, affirms the Oneness of God (on the basis of Deut 6:4) and condemns the (ab)use that Christians make of the same Deut 6:4 to “prove” that “they are three and that the three are one”.

Marcellus of Ancyra and how he would have saved us from the "Cappadocian compromise"

Marcellus of Ancyra (died ca. 374 CE) is an enigmatic figure. He was a staunch Nicene, friend of Athanasius, defended by popes but also reviled as a heretic. Eusebius of Caesarea wrote two polemical tracts against Marcellus, Contra Marcellum and De Ecceiastica Theologia

Joseph  Lienhard wrote a fundamental book about him, Contra Marcellum: Marcellus of Ancyra and Fourth-Century Theology (Washington, D.C., 1999).

The beginning of Lienhard’s the book is an account of Marcellus' life (pages 1-19) and a list of nine works that can possibly be attributed to him (pages 19-27). Marcellus' major work, the Contra Asterium, published in 336, only survives in fragments, mainly quotations by Eusebius. The rest of the book is an account of what people said Marcellus' heresy was and investigation into the truthfulness of the claims (pages 28 to 240). By 355 Marcellus retired into obscurity.

Critics claimed that Marcellus believed that God was a Monad and only emerged as a Trinity for the sake of salvation (page 50). Marcellus was labelled as a Sabellian. Lienhard points out this comes from his opponents and not from Marcellus's own writings. In the end Lienhard affirms that Marcellus was guilty of a bit too much speculation (which he somewhat disavowed in the end) and some inconsistencies in his christological/theological terminology.

One of the useful aspects of Lienhard’s book is that it makes one understand better that the Arian controversy was much more complex than most textbooks let on.

Two passages from Lienhard’s book, in particular, are worth quoting.

Epiphanius of Salamis writes 'I myself once asked the blessed pope Athanasius about this Marcellus, what his opinion of him was. He neither defended him nor expressed hostility towards him. He only smiled, and indicated that he was not far from error, but he considered him excused'. (page 9)

But Athanasius never betrayed Marcellus. Basil of Caesarea, the leading figure of the Cappadocians, wrote to Athanasius to secure a Western condemnation of Marcellus (Ep. 69, 2; 82). Athanasius left Basil’s letters unanswered, and never acted. Basil later complained that his letters to Athanasius had accomplished nothing (Ep. 89, 2 to Meletius).

Lienhard writes, 'Marcellus of Ancyra is one of the more intriguing figures of the fourth century. While he is hardly the most important theologian of that century, he played a small but significant role in the development of doctrine in that era' (page 141).

But it is the concluding paragraph of the book that, somehow, indicates that Lienhard didn’t say all that he wanted to say:

Marcellus, and many who though as he did, finally snapped the great chain of being and freed Christian doctrine from one of the most perduring assumptions of the Platonic world-view. As the eastern Church accepted the formula "one ousia, three hypostaseis", it gained clarity in its doctrine. But Marcellus may still say to the Church that the phrase remains in need of careful explanation and that there are other ways, too, of speaking about the mystery of God, One and Three. (Contra Marcellum, cit, p. 244 - emphasis added)

What "other ways"? The options are not unlimited. The "Cappadocian settlement" is unsatisfactory (besides being un-scriptural), because it is an unstable compromise, permanently oscillating between tritheism and modalism. Then, what are the other options we are left with?

Having read Marcellus’ excerpts, in particular in the quotations from the books that Eusebius of Caesarea wrote to attack him (Contra Marcellum and De Ecclesiastica Theologia) I am believe that the correct interpretation of Marcellus' central thought is this: God is one ousia, one hypostasis and one prosopon. He is also, ab aeterno, endowed with two essential attributes, His Word (logos, dabar) and His Spirit (pneuma, ruach).

Jesus is, indeed, the Incarnation of God’s eternal Word and, after the Resurrection and the Ascension, forever seated at God’s right, as Lord.

Was Origen a unitarian? Nah!

One of Dale Tuggy's favs (at the his SEP > Trinity and SEP > Unitarianism entries - the latter subordinated by Tuggy himself to the Trinity entry by calling it a "Supplement to Trinity"; amply supported in many posts at his blog trinities.org/blog: see here and here, for a selection) is that Subordinationism has nothing to do with Trinitarianism (which Tuggy considers to exist only in its fully-fledged, co-eternal, co-equal, tri-personal, final verson), whereas it would be a sub-category of Unitarianism.

Of course this is historically ludicrous (the fully-fledged Trinity certainly did not pop out of the blue in 381 AD or later; the terms "unitarian" and "unitarianism" both appeared at the end of the 17th century, with reference to a phenomenon that is no earlier, anyway, than the 16th century, with Lelio Sozzini (1525 - 1562) and Fausto Sozzini (1539 - 1604), respectively uncle and nephew). 

But even a simple look at dictionary definitions shows the obvious:

• [subordinationism] the doctrine that the first person of the Holy Trinity is superior to the second, and the second superior to the third. (Dictionary.com, © Random House, Inc. 2017)

• [subordinationism] either of two interpretations of the doctrine of the Trinity, often regarded as heretical, according to which the Son is subordinate to the Father or the Holy Ghost is subordinate to both (Collins English Dictionary – Copyright © HarperCollins Publishers)

• [subordinationism] the theological tenet of progressively declining essence within the Trinity. (-Ologies & -Isms. Copyright 2008 The Gale Group, Inc.)

• [subordinationism] a doctrine in theology: the second and third persons of the Trinity are subordinate (as in order or essence) to the first person and the Holy Spirit is subordinate to the Son (© 2017 Merriam-Webster, Incorporated)

The last of the list is, IMO, the most obvious and intuitive and, I believe the closest to the common understanding. Certainly none of them is too narrow.

So, not only Dale Tuggy makes a totally idiosyncratic use of the notions of Unitarianism and Subordinationism, but he repeatedly tries to argue that Origen (ca. 184 - 254) is a Unitarian (see here).
I have repeatedy affirmed that Origen IS a trinitarian, of the Subordinationist kind. More, his doctrine of the “eternal generation of the son” will be absolutely essential to the later full-fledged Trinitarians, so much so that both Athanasius of Alexandria and Basil of Caesarea (the eldest of the Cappadocian scoundrels) strongly defended Origen’s (trinitarian) orthodoxy.

This is what we read about him in the Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Origen shows himself to be one of the most original and profound of speculative theologians. Neoplatonist in background, he constructed a system that embraces both the notion of the preexistence of souls, with their fall and final restoration, and a deeply subordinationist doctrine of the Trinity—i.e., one in which the Son is subordinate to the Father. (Encyclopaedia Britannica > Patristic literature)

As for the logical/grammatical/semantic point of the adjective "Subordinationist", the very word presupposes that there are (at least) two entities – of the same or similar nature– that are hierarchically subordinated, so, indeed, the expression “subordinationist unitarian” is (if not a "contradiction in terms"), certainly an oxymoron. On the other hand, to say that creatures are subordinated to their Creator is a triviality.

Justin Martyr, with his doctrine of the Logos as theos kai kyrios eteros was certainly a Subordinationist. In fact, with good reason, the first Subordinationist. As repeatedly affirmed by me, it was with Justin Martyr that the Philonian “original sin” of the “two gods” entered Christianity.
That the word Trinity would have “come to mean a triune god, a tripersonal god in some sense containing equal persons” (as Dale Tuggy says here) is certainly obvious by the end of the 4th century. To affirm that the word “trinity” would not have been used before then, is manifestly false. The ONLY thing that the pre-Constantinopolitan Trinity lacked before 381 is precisely the co-equality (and, for some, the co-eternity). To deny that pre-Nicene/Constantinopolitan Trinity would have been Trinity is to beg the question of what is relevant to the definition of Trinity.
One thing that Dale Tuggy omits to confront is whether there is any support, in the Scripture (OT and NT) for referring to the pre-incarnated Word/Logos/Dabar as "person", and to the Spirit/Pneuma/Ruwach as "person" at all, not in the unusual and obfuscating sense of "subsistence" (or "supposit" as some fancily say), BUT in the common sense of “self conscious being, endowed with reason, freedom and will“. More or less the definition of Severinus Boethius. (BTW, there is no support, in the Scripture …)

Obviously Arius and the Arians broke with the ante-Nicene Fathers, otherwise the Arian Controversy which, obviously, Nicea 325 was not enough for settling, would be totally incomprehensible. Was Arius a “trinitarian”? Certainly NOT in the sense of the equality of the “Son” with the Father, but also NOT in the sense of the similarity, because he affirmed (for the first time, and clearly departing from the tradition) that the “Son” was NOT generated, not emanated, BUT created by God, the Father Almighty. 

Was Arius a Subordinationist? Most certainly NOT in the sense that Origen was (and Tertullian, and others) were.

Insisting that everything before Arius is "unitarianism" simply fails to explain the whole dynamic of Christian dogma, in particular in its most critical period, the Arian Controversy, from beginning to (authoritarian) end, from 318 to 381.

 "Humanitarian unitarianism” is too reductive, because it doesn't take into account Jesus' divinity, and that the ONLY way to take into account Jesus’ divinity is to affirm, with the Prologue to the Gospel of John, that Jesus is indeed (NOT a pre-existing “person”, BUT) truly and literally (NOT by way of metaphor), the Incarnation of God’s Eternal Word/Logos/Dabar.

Subordinationism, Arianism, Trinitarianism, Unitarianism, Strict Monotheism

1. Some claim (Dale Tuggy is one of them - see trinities.org/blog) that one can only properly speak of "trinity" or "trinitarianism" when one has the whole hog doctrine (co-eternality, co-equality, tri-personality, "one ousia in three hypostaseis"). But this is pure sophistry, because that definition was only achieved at the end of the 4^th century, after a prolonged strife first between the Arians and the Nicene, then the semi-Arians and the new-Nicene, then through the "great compromise" of the Synod of Alexandria of 362 AD, then through the (essential) role of the Cappadocian scoundrels.

2. As is well known , the Arian controversy started with the rebuttal of Arius, in response to the doctrine of the similarity of the "Son" to the father, preached by the (then) bishop of Alexandria, his bishop. Mark this, only similarity, not equality. To which sermon, Arius replied that "if the Father begat the Son, he that was begotten had a beginning of existence: and from this it is evident, that there was a time when the Son was not. It therefore necessarily follows, that he

[the Son] had his substance from nothing." (The Ecclesiastical Histories of Socrates Scholasticus) What Alexander affirmed was simply the standard belief of the Church, or at least of its highest ranks. Origen brought it even further, by affirming the "eternal generation of the Son" (a formula that, later, turned out to be very useful to the "trinitarians" ...) It certainly did NOT alter the status quo. It was Arius who undoubtedly altered the status quo, affirming (or at least implying) that the "Son" was a creature.

3. Subordinationism, that is the doctrine that the "Son" (and the Spirit) are divine beings, BUT are inferior to the Father, is intrinsically un-stable, if affirmed within the Scriptural Religion, that is a religion which proclaims the unconditional Oneness of God. Inevitably, under a challenge like the one that Arius brought forth, it can only evolve (and stabilize) into full-fledged "trinitarianism" (or "binitarianism"), OR it can evolve into "unitarianism" (in the obvious sense that there is no such thing as a "pre-existing Son" – let alone "pre-existing Son" and that Jesus was just a man, however exalted.)

4. There is another option, that I refer to as Strict Monotheism. Historically it was fully formulated only by Marcellus of Ancyra: the Word/logos/dabar and the Spirit/pneuma/ruach are essential, eternal attributes of the One God and Father. Jesus Christ is real God because the divine logos got incarnated (sarx egeneto) in him. He is real man, having derived his real humanity from the Blessed Virgin Mary. Jesus Christ is a real person, BUT, contrary to what Trinitarians (and also Subordinationists and even Arians) affirm, NOT a split second before he was conceived by the BVM.

To whom does the title Lord belong?

Christians have always claimed to be in profound theological unity with Israel’s great confession: “Hear, O Israel, The Lord our God is one Lord” (Dt 6:4 LXX); yet they have have had no qualm about confessing “one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist” (1 Cor 8:6).

Lets examine in full the two verses, and evidence the Greek of the critical words …

“Hear, O Israel, The Lord our God is one Lord” [kyrios eis] (Dt 6:4 LXX)

“Yet for us there is one God [eis theos], the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord [eis kyrios], Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist.” 1 Cor 8:6)

… it becomes even more evident that Paul attributes ONLY to Jesus the qualification of eis kyrios, that the Deuteronomy attributes ONLY to YHWH …

… unless, of course, in desperation, one claims that the order of the words eis and kyrios makes all the difference. 

So, reading the text of 1 Corinthians 8:6, it seem that Paul has introduced a very relevant shift in the Biblical doctrine of the Godhead: the “one God, the Father” shares the title of “one Lord” with the Jesus Christ, nay Jesus Christ has become the “one Lord”.

Perhaps, more that anything else, this is the reason why the Jews considered Paul with great suspicion.