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| Trinity Celtic Knot |
I have finished reading Dale Tuggy’s book on the Trinity.
Herebelow are some quotations and my relative reading notes. Usually I have kept quotations small, whereas my relative notes refer to an ampler context.
This post is quite long, and is mostly a criticism of Tuggy's book, but I believe that it picks out fairly many of its weaknesses.
Anyway, I share my notes with whoever is interested in reading them.
Introduction
[page 1 – position 24] Were these three divine “Persons” God’s personalities? His aspects? Parts? Or were they three full-blown divine selves? And if this last, how was this not three gods?
One of dale Tuggy's peculiar choices is to use the word "person" as though it was highly different from "self".
In the American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language we read:
person (n) 3. The composite of characteristics that make up an individual personality; the self.
self (n) 1. The total, essential, or particular being of a person; the individual; 2. The essential qualities distinguishing one person from another; individuality
Looking at other dictionaries (Collins English Dictionary; Random House Kernerman Webster's College Dictionary) we see that, "person" normally refers to rational individuals, whereas "self" can be extended also to things. But I doubt that, when DT speaks of God as a self, this is what he has in mind.
1 Don’t be Afraid to think about God
[page 6 – position 78] But how does one advance beyond the ability to pronounce the words? The answer is simple: one tries to understand what they’re supposed to mean, what they’re supposed to express.
To "tr[y] to understand what [the words of the Creed are] supposed to mean [and] express" may lead to a problematic result, because one is supposed to understand them in agreement with the Church (or church) to which one belongs.
2 Formulas vs. Interpretations
[page 15 – position 180] We believe in one God the Father all powerful, maker of all things both seen and unseen. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only-begotten begotten from the Father… [“First Council of Nicea – 325,” in Norman Tanner, editor, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, Volume I: Nicea I – Lateran V (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), 1-19, 5.]
DT omits to say that a confusing phrase was added at Constantinople (381), "before all ages" (Gr. pro pantōn tōn aionōn), so that the new reading became into "the only-begotten begotten from the Father before all ages". Marcellus of Ancyra, one of the key figures at Nicea, would certainly have never subscribed to this addition.
[page 16 – position 192] What is meant by “begotten,” and how does this differ from being made, being created, or being caused to exist? Again, the document leaves us to wonder.
The text of the Creed of Nicea (325) certainly does not explain the contrast expressed by "begotten not made". The simplest analogy available to us is that, for humans, we would not say that a father "made" his child, but that he "begot" (or generated) him/her.
[page 16 – position 195] This claim [“consubstantial with the Father”] is and was baffling. The term “consubstantial” had never been used before in any broadly popular theological statement, and its meaning was unclear.
This is grossly inaccurate. In fact the term "consubstantial" (homoousios), which BTW is definitely not scriptural, was first used by the Gnostics ("before the Gnostics there is no trace at all of its existence" – see von Harnack, Ortiz de Urbina, Mendizabal, Prestige, Gerlitz, Boularand, Kelly, Dinsen, Stead), and was even condemned in at least one of the Synods of Antioch (264 – 269 CE), held against Paul of Samosata.
[page 17 – position 201] And if this essence is supposed to be a property, a feature, is it supposed to be a universal property, like humanity or horseness, in which case, it would seem that Father and Son are two gods, or was it supposed to be an individual essence like being Socrates, in which case, Father and Son would be numerically one? (An individual essence is by definition unshareable.)
This is an Aristotelic-Scholastic shibboleth. That it cannot be entirely true is confirmed by the historical fact that Socrates, somehow, passed on his "individual essence" to his children.
[page 17 – position 208] In light of previous catholic theologies c. 150-325, we read this [“…through whom all things came to be”] as claiming that the pre-human Jesus, or the divine element in him, was the direct agent of creation, God being the indirect and ultimate source of creation.
The alternative that DT formulates so carelessly ("the pre-human Jesus, or the divine element in him") is, in fact very critical. IF the "pre-human Jesus" (the logos) was a personal entity, then we have a duo-hypostatic understanding of God. IF the "pre-human Jesus" (the logos) was an essential attribute of God, then only a mia-hypostatic understanding of God is possible.
[page 17 – position 209] God created by having this being – called “the Word” in John 1: 1 – do it on his behalf, so that only the latter, as it were, got his hands dirty.
This is a grossly improper reading of John 1:1 and, most of all, of John 1:3, where we do not read that "God created by having this being – called “the Word” in John 1: 1 – do it on his behalf", BUT that "All things were made through it" (panta di'autou egeneto), where "it" (autos) is masculine simply because logos happens to be masculine, just as pneuma happens to be neuter and sophia happens to be feminine.
The logos, in creation, was NOT a subject, BUT an instrument, very much like his hands are an instrument for an artisan, or voice, speech and movement are an istrument for an actor.
[page 17 – position 211] This [instrumental role of the personal, pre-existent, divine, distinct logos in creation] can be contested on scriptural and philosophical grounds, but at the time it was widely held, having been promoted by many for both biblical and philosophical/ theological reasons since the time of Justin Martyr. (c. 150)
This is a disconcerting sentence. According to DT, "biblical and philosophical/ theological reasons" would have motivated, "since the time of Justin Martyr (c. 150)", the doctrine that a divine (albeit subordinated), personal logos would have been instrumental in creation.
Yet the recourse to the Bible and to Philosophy would provide "ground", today, for "contesting" the very same doctrine. I challenge DT to provide those "reasons" and "grounds", old and new, for respectively "promoting" and "contesting" the very same doctrine.
[page 18 – position 212] “Became incarnate” is unclear. Did this eternal spirit (the Word) somehow control or combine with a complete man? Or did he become the soul of a certain human body? Or did this spirit somehow form one person with both a body and a normal human soul? Or were there two selves in Jesus, the man, the human self, and this eternal spirit, the direct creator, the two of them somehow cooperating in what looked like the earthly life of one self?
The “became incarnate” is not unclear: the logos, God's eternal, essential attribute, "became incarnate" (sarx egeneto) in Jesus, exactly as John 1:14 says. And it is not true that the Council of Chalcedon resorted to "impenetrable formulas" [see footnote 22]. The Confession of Chalcedon provides a clear statement on the human and divine nature of Christ, perhaps even in spite of the intention of its Trinitarian formulators.
[page 18 – position 221] (To the “Arians” it made the Son too much like God to say that they’re “consubstantial,” and it bothered them that the term was neither scriptural nor traditional.)
Interestingly enough, no reference to the logos was included in the Nicene Creed (325), even if it is fully scriptural, and it was an integral part of the Creed with which Eusebius of Caesarea presented himself at Nicea, hoping that it would be adopted, or at least used substantially as a basis for the new "official" creed. (see Eusebius of Caesarea, Letter on the Council of Nicaea, @ Catholic Encyclopedia)
[page 19 – position 228] In this case [the inclusion of the homoousios at Nicea 325], various theologians assert that the “consubstantial” claim (whatever it is!) is implied by scripture, or at least that it best explains what scripture says and doesn’t say.
This ["the 'consubstantial' claim ... is implied by scripture"] would be a rather big mouthful to swallow. Even Athanasius admits, more or less explicitly, that the homoousios (unscriptural, of Gnostic - and probably Hermetic - origin, condemned at Antioch in 264-269) was resorted to in desperation, so as to present the Arians with a formula that they would never subscribe to.
[page 20 – position 241] Some theologians take a “Person” in this case to be something like a way God intrinsically and essentially is, something like a personality God always and necessarily lives in. But others take a “Person” to be a self, a being capable of thought, desire, and friendship.
Here we go, with DT's ploy that "person" and "self" would be clearly different terms.
[page 23 – position 265] The book you’re holding sticks rigorously to relatively uncontroversial logical, historical, and biblical points, so as to help you navigate through the options.
In spite of his claims, DT deludes himself that his book "sticks rigorously to relatively uncontroversial logical, historical, and biblical points". Certainly his historical understanding is superficial, to be kind. He simply does not realize that the doctrine of the Trinity, in the definitive form that it assumed with the Council of Constantinople (381 CE), thanks to the Cappadocian scoundrels, is a long process of just a bit less than 250 years, attempting to reconcile Christian doctrine with Biblical Monotheism, severely harmed by the "original sin" of the “another God and Lord” (Gr. theos kai kurios eteros - introduced by Justin Martyr in his "Dialogue with Trypho", ch. 56). A process precipitated by the Arian Controversy.
3 Trinity vs. trinity
[page 26 – position 290] This [rendering trias with “triad”] helps the reader to avoid anachronistically importing the later idea of a tripersonal god into the passage. This triad or trinity is just a threesome, a group of three somethings. It is not implied that these three are of the same kind or status, or that they are parts of any whole.
Yet, DT doesn't stop to wonder why Theophilus of Antioch referred to "God and his Logos and his Sophia" as a "triad" (Gr. trias). Wouldn't everybody find it bizarre if a man, his mind and his wisdom were referred to as a "triad"? And it is simply false that "God and his Logos and his Sophia" are spoken of, by Theophilus as "just a threesome". Otherwise, why would both the Logos and the Sophia be specified as "his", that is God's? Obviously because there is a strict relationship between God, "his Logos" and "his Sophia". Nothing, on the other hand, suggests that this Logos and this Sophia are personal entities.
[page 26 – position 294] God, God’s Word (i.e. the logos of John 1), and God’s “wisdom” – evidently the Holy Spirit.
That for Theophilus "his Sophia" would be "evidently" just another way to refer to God's Holy Spirit is not at all ... evident. In fact, by most exegetes the Wisdom/Sophia of which we read in the Bible (in particular in its personified form at Proverbs 8) is equated to the Logos.
[page 27 – position 303] We can then reserve “Trinity” for the one God in three “Persons” which catholic Christianity made mandatory in the last two decades of the fourth century.
This is formally correct, if by "Trinity" we refer to the "end product" of the Cappadocian scoundrels (co-equal, co-eternal, tri-personal). However, DT hides here his strong bias: he refuses to even consider referring to what came before the "Trinity", for the simple reason that he has made the fundamental choice of subsuming Subordinationism under the rubric Unitarianism.
So, for him the Subordinationist "trinity" (small "t") is ... Unitarian. This simply goes against any dictionary. Pure Tuggy-an idiosyncrasy.
[page 27 – position 308] All occurrences of the words translated “god” or “God” or “Lord” refer to the Father (a.k.a. Yahweh, “the Lord”), or to Jesus, or to a spirit, a foreign deity, a ghost, a man, or an idol, and arguably once or twice to God’s own Spirit (or spirit).
Among all the Biblical uses of the word "god" (small "g"), DT omits to include "the god of this world/age" (2 Cor 4:4), that is Satan.
[page 28 – position 312] The Old Testament focuses on God, and the New Testament on God’s Son and on the workings of God’s Spirit (or spirit). Yes, the Bible is, so to speak, all about the trinity, the triad.
This statement is sloppy (to be kind). It is certainly true that "the New Testament [focuses] on God’s Son", Jesus Christ and on "the workings of God’s Spirit". But DT (for his more than dubious reasons) omits to confront a central question, that is: is the Logos, before the Incarnation, a personal entity? Is the Holy Spirit a personal entity?
[page 29 – position 322] Three beings can also be mentioned as one, if the three in some sense compose one.
The important point which DT avoids to clarify is in what sense God, His Logos and His Spirit "compose one".
[page 29 – position 327] Both unitarian and trinitarian Christians believe in the trinity, but only trinitarians, following catholic tradition (and many would add, the Bible rightly understood) believe in the Trinity.
This is a tad confusing. Presumably DT does not agree with those who "believe in the Trinity" (capital "T"), and claim to understand the Bible "rightly".
[page 29 – position 330] For trinitarians, “trinity” refers to the Three as such, and “Trinity” refers to the one tripersonal God. For unitarians, “trinity” refers to the Three as such, and “Trinity” doesn’t refer.
This is certainly a clearer statement than the one to which the previous note is appended. Of course, bearing in mind DT’s highly idiosyncratic use of the adjective “unitarian”.
[page 29 – position 332] Some unitarians would rather be rid of both “Trinity” and “trinity,” but I don’t see why this must happen, given the pre-trinitarian usage of “trinity,” (c. 185 – c. 380) and the fact that this plural-referring usage is still common.
This is a very central statement of DT's attitude. DT stubbornly refuses to consider that the problem is precisely this cropping up, on top of the Scripture and of the Apostolic faith (more or less with Justin Martyr), of this (Subordinationist) "trinity" (small "t").
[page 30 – position 335] The word “trinity” has been a useful plural referring term since the late 100s, and “Trinity” is useful for referring to God as conceived by trinitarians.
See previous note.
[page 30 – position 337] They [trinitarians] point out, correctly, the universal Christian belief in the trinity, and then act as if this shows universal Christian belief in the Trinity.
The apologists of the Trinity (capital "T") resort deliberately to their ambiguity because they want to affirm the full divinity of Jesus Christ "true God and true man". But is the Trinity (capital "T") the only way to affirm the full divinity of Jesus Christ? Seeing the conclusions at which the Unitarians (Socinians, to be clear) arrive, this would appear to be the case. Yet, as Joseph T. Lienhard writes in the very last sentence of his book on Marcellus of Ancyra, "there were other ways [other than the Cappadocian "one ousia, three hypostaseis"] ... of speaking about the mystery of God, One and Three."
[page 30 – position 345] In sum, the trinity or triad is God (aka the Father), God’s Son, and the Spirit of God, without prejudice as to whether or not they share a nature or are one god.
Sheesh! Talk about "ambiguity"!
[page 30 – position 347] The word “trinity” is a plural referring term, while the word “Trinity” is a singular referring term.
Not quite. The term Trinity (capital "T") is a "singular referring term" inasmuch as it refers to the "one ousia", BUT it is a "plural referring term" inasmuch as it refers to the "three hypostases".
[page 32 – position 364] God’s “Spirit” is a “Person” of the Trinity like the other two, while his “spirit” is an aspect, attribute, or action of God.
How sloppy and careless! There is a vast difference whether God's spirit (small "s") is and "aspect", or an "attribute" or an "action" o God.
[page 32 – position 367] ... a “person” is a self, a personal being, a someone, a being for whom one must use personal pronouns.
See above quotation and note: if the "spirit" is an "aspect, attribute, or action of God", it (it ...) certainly is NOT a person, that is "a self, a personal being, a someone, a being for whom one must use personal pronouns".
[page 32 – position 368] “Unitarian” relates to historically unitarian denominations or churches, while “unitarian” refers to theologies on which the one God just is the Father alone. This latter is merely a descriptive term to form a pair with the contrary adjective “trinitarian.”
Here DT is spectacularly inconsistent with himself: if "trinitarian" includes "subordinationist" (like Justin Martyr, Tertullian and Origen, just to name a few) and, according to DT's idiosyncratic use, "subordinationists" are "unitarians", then "subordinationists" CANNOT be "trinitarians", even with a small "t". Otherwise we would have the ludicrous claim that "unitarianism" would include "trinitarianism". Which, BTW, is exactly what DT does in his SEP article Unitarianism (“Supplement to Trinity”).
[page 32 – position 370] One could use “trinitarian” to refer to belief in the triad (trinity) and “Trinitarian” to refer to belief in the Trinity, but I think it’s less confusing to simply reserve the term “trinitarian” for belief in the Trinity.
Again, here DT is resorting to more obfuscation, with his capitalized vs un-capitalized word: after expending so many pages insisting of the difference between "trinity" and "Trinity" now he wants to treat the adjective "trinitarian", derived from the noun "trinity", differently, claiming that "it’s less confusing to simply reserve the term 'trinitarian' for belief in the Trinity". Sheesh!
4 The “deity of Christ” vs. the Trinity
[page 38 – position 412] The mainstream ancient interpretation of “the deity of Christ” was not a statement of identity between the deity (God) and Christ, but rather a statement about how Christ is, a qualitative claim about Christ, that he is divine, that he has the quality of deity.
In note n. 36 appended to this sentence, DT shows how little he understands the meaning of mia-hypostatic theology, when he speaks of some mia-hypostatic theologians "speculating that the logos was an attribute and action of God, and so not an additional being to God". Again, an "attribute" and an "action" are very different notions.
[page 38 – position 416] To believe in “the deity of Christ” was to believe that he also had, in addition to his human nature (like yours or mine), a divine nature.
Do Unitarians believe in the "deity of Christ", in the sense that his divine nature is the same as that of the One and Only God? Socinians certainly don't. In fact they believe that Jesus was only endowed with a human nature.
[page 38 – position 422] But that God is tripersonal and that Christ is divine are not the same claim!
This is certainly true. Unfortunately DT doesn't seem to draw the appropriate conclusions from his exclamation ...
[page 39 – position 426] There have been many Christians who have believed in the deity of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, but have not believed in a tripersonal god. Some of these are modern day “Oneness” Pentecostals. They stoutly deny traditional trinitarian claims (belief in the Trinity), yet they affirm the deity of all three.
DT omits to say that "Oneness" Pentecostals "affirm the deity of all three" for the simple reason that advocates of "Oneness" (ancient Modalists and modern Pentecostals alike) ... deny that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three! Fortunately DT clarifies that in the following sentence.
[page 39 – position 430] Famous examples [of identification of the one true God with the Father alone] include the learned Anglican minister and philosopher-theologian Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) and the towering intellectual of third-century catholic Christianity, the philosopher-theologian-apologist-biblical-scholar Origen of Alexandria. (c. 185 - c. 254)
Again, for DT it seems to be totally indifferent whether the Logos and the Spirit are personal entities (however subordinated) or attributes of the One and Only God.
[page 39 – position 433] Do you think that each member of the Trinity must be divine to the same degree, or in the same way?
If DT was consistent with his enunciated "Convention of Capitals" then the answer to the question should be obvious: Trinity ONLY means "co-equal, co-eternal, tri-personal" and therefore its (or his? or His?) members "must be divine to the same degree". The two questions that are to be answered are of divinity AND of personality.
[page 40 – position 440] And after there were doctrines about how God is tripersonal, still some learned Christians, like Clarke, didn’t believe those, but did believe in the deity of Christ.
Obviously Clarke did NOT believe in the deity of Christ, on a par with that of God, the Father Almighty, by only in his "deity": a diminutive deity, as it were.
5 Get a Date
[page 43 – position 449] We’ll see that the elements of this sort of theology arose gradually, with belief in the Trinity lagging behind belief in the trinity.
This is an interesting statement. Whether it was "trinity" or "Trinity", neither of them envisaged a Monarchian (to be accurate dynamic Modalist, or Sabellian) understanding of God.
[page 43 – position 456] As we saw in chapter 3, talk of the trinity (triad) enters into catholic tradition in the late second century, but this doesn’t imply belief in the Trinity (triune God); as their creeds and other writings show, mainstream Christians c. 150-370 continued to identify the one God with the Father only.
A thought for Dale Tuggy: the "trinity" inevitably becomes the "Trinity", under the Biblical constraint that the LORD is One and there is no other (Deuteronomy 6:4; Isaiah 45:5). The "trinity" is a stage on the way to the final disaster of the "Trinity".
[page 46 – position 482] Logically, for Christians to be trinitarian in the sense defined at Constantinople (381), they have to believe certain things. One is that the Son is divine, and just as divine as the Father (“ true God from true God”), not in some lesser way. Another, relatedly, is that Son is eternal, that he never came into existence, never began to exist. The same two points must hold regarding the Holy Spirit. He must be fully divine, as the Father is divine, and he must always have existed (or must exist timelessly); he can’t have come into existence.
Interestingly, among the requirements "for Christians to be trinitarian in the sense defined at Constantinople (381)", DT distinguishes between "that the Son is divine, and just as divine as the Father" (which was certainly affirmed already at Nicea 325) and "that Son is eternal, that he never came into existence, never began to exist", which was added only at Constantinople 381, with the clause "before all ages" (Gr. pro pantōn tōn aionōn), appended after "begotten of the Father".
There is no doubt that Jesus is a personal being (in the obvious sense of the word person, viz. a conscious being endowed with reason, freedom and will). Therefore, for Trinitarians, also the eternal Son (being the pre-incarnated, nay eternal form of Jesus' divinity) must be a personal entity. And, if the Spirit is co-equal with the Father and the Son, he must also be a personal entity. This is the inescapable logic of attributing to the hypostases of God co-equality and co-eternity. None of this, of course, is found in and founded on the Scripture.
[page 47 – position 491] Quoting Proverbs 8, he insists that ...
... the very Wisdom of God [i.e. the pre-human Jesus] is declared to be born and created, for the especial reason that we should not suppose that there is any other being than God alone [i.e. the Father] who is unbegotten and uncreated. [Tertullian, Against Hermogenes, Chapter 18]
It seems almost impossible that such intelligent and learned person as Tertullian did not understand that the Wisdom of God of which we read at Proverbs 8 is NOT a real person, BUT a personification: a rhetoric figure.
[page 49 – position 511] But for Origen, the Son and Spirit are not divine in the same way as the Father ...
This is an essential definition of Subordinationism, by the way ...
[page 51 – position 524] How early did mainstream Christians come to insist that the Son is not subordinate to the Father, so that the Son is neither less great nor less divine than him? The first major step in this direction was the creed at Nicea in 325.
What DT either does not know or chooses not to say is that there is good support for affirming that the homoousios was suggested to the Conciliar Fathers by Constantine himself, who, far from being a rough and simple soldier had, in Nicomedia's court, in his youth, learned about pagan philosophers such as the neo-platonic Porphyry (who attacked violently Christians), and about Christian philosophers like Lactantius, deeply imbibed in Platonism. He had almost certainly also gone to Egypt to become acquainted with Hermetic spirituality. Constantine had sufficient philosophical competence and familiarity with the Hermetic notion of homousios, and tried to reassure the Christians of his favour towards an elevated (Platonic) religion like the Christian for the good of the Empire (Constantine, Speech to the Assembly of Saints in McKechnie, Paul, The First Christian Centuries, Downers Grove: IVP, 2007, p.238), attributing to Plato and his philosophy concepts of pure Hermetic origin. In this sense Eusebius of Caesarea was his great "propagandist" to the bishops gathered at the Council of Nicea. Moreover, Lactantius himself writes openly that the source of Plato's philosophy is that of Hermes Trismegistus (which he manifestly considers - erroneously although unwittingly - much older than that of Plato).
[page 51 – position 525] This creed [Nicea 325] rebukes the Alexandrian presbyter Arius, who basically insisted more loudly than most on the subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father.
This is ridiculous downplaying of the clean break that Arius operated with previous theology, in particular the theology of Origen. Origen certainly was a subordinationist, BUT clearly affirmed that the Son was generated by God, the Father Almighty, in eternity ("eternal generation of the Son"). Arius, on the contrary, affirmed (by all evidence consciously and deliberately) that the Son was a creature, however created before all the rest of Creation: his sentence, "He must have come after the Father, therefore a time obviously was when He was not [Gr. ēn pote oti ouk ēn], and hence He was a finite being", leaves no doubt about this.
6 “Persons”
[page 62 – position 623] Can this be the great discovery of Christian theology - that within the one God there are three “somewhats,” [Latin: tria quaedam] three something-or-others?
The reason why, as Augustine candidly confessed, "we do not call these three together 'one person,' as we call them 'one being' and 'one god'" [Augustine of Hippo, On the Trinity, Chapter 6 (@ ccel.org) § 11, quoted - with modifications - by DT at p. 61, pos. 615] is devastatingly simple: already by the end of the 4th century, and with a vengeance nowadays, in our "postmodern" climate, many theologians do not believe that God is personal (in the obvious sense of person: a conscious entity, endowed with reason, freedom and will), but rather a mysterious "source of being". It seems that a-theism is the best kept secret of theology.
[page 62 – position 632] But even worms, probably, are conscious.
"Probably"? Sheesh! And why not amoebas, or viruses, or molecules, or atoms, or electrons, or quarks?
[page 63 – position 637] Because in trinitarian theology theorists are wont to insist on some special meaning for “Person,” I have labeled this universal concept as the concept of a “self.”
Here, for the first time (AFAIK), DT clarifies (or so it seems) that "self" is, for him, some sort of generalization of "person".
[page 64 – position 646] Thus, Jesus prays to his Father, and sometimes, the Father speaks about or to Jesus. This seems to presuppose that both Father and Son are selves. And in a few passages, “the Holy Spirit” is said to speak, intercede, testify, or to grieve – things which arguably only selves can do.
With a remarkable switch and bait, DT first speaks of Jesus (a person whose existence began in Palestine, ca. 4 BCE), and then speaks of "Son", remaining vague on whether this "Son" is a personal entity who pre-exists Jesus. As for the Holy Spirit who "is said to speak, intercede, testify, or to grieve", DT has already argued (appropriately, IMO) that (in particular in the episode of Ananias and Sapphira in Acts) "we can ... read such phrases ["lied to the Holy Spirit", "to test the Spirit of the Lord" - Acts5:3,9] as a way of referring to God": with a figure of speech, a synecdoche.
[page 65 – position 666] On this view [Karl Barth; Karl Rahner], the “Persons” are not selves, but ways the one divine self is. I call this one-self trinitarianism.
This (which seems very similar to the above cited comment by Augustine in his On the Trinity, Chapter 6, § 11) adds confusion to confusion: if God is not one "person" (or "Person"), how can he (it?) be one "self"?
[page 65 – position 678] Lest someone object that this is “Sabellianism,” a view attributed to the obscure third century theologian Sabellius, and repeatedly denounced since then, these modern theologians have a reply: these modes are eternally concurrent, not one-after-the-other, and each is essential to God.
To be consequent, and to distinguish this position clearly from "social trinitarianism", it would make sense to call it "concurrent modalism".
[page 67 – position 686] Either you give up real interpersonal friendship between the “Persons,” or you compromise monotheism, with three “fully divine” selves, each seemingly a god.
This should be a problem ONLY for "egalitarian trinitarians", NOT for Subordinationists or (strict) Unitarians.
[page 68 – position 699] The Trinity is either a self or not. It’s a matter of logic that these can’t both be true: there’s exactly one divine self, and [or?] there are exactly three divine selves.
There is another, more disturbing possibility, viz. that the "Trinity" is just a mask upon a non-personal being, or, as (for instance) Paul Tillich expressed himself, "source of being". And it is not a consolation to hear that this "source of being" is "totally other" (German: ganz andere).
7 “Substance” Abuse?
[page 71 – position 729] Rather than lecture you on Greek philosophy, I’ll now explain nine potential interpretations, nine candidate meanings of “ousia.”
DT seems to put great stock by his "nine potential interpretations" (1. Same individual entity, 2. Same universal essence, 3. Same individual essence, 4. Same haecceity, 5. Same kind of matter, 6. Same portion of matter, 7. Same parts, 8. Similar beings, 9. Self and his action), giving, for each of them, the "meaning", and the "interpretation" and examining the "problem" with each. Very much in the itemized style of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica.
[page 78 – position 805] We see nine options here. I’m not sure that these are all the options, but I’m sure that these are different options.
After some exam, that leads him to affirm boldly that he is "sure" that his 9 options are "different options", (although he admits not to be sure that they are "all the options"), DT goes on to say that 1 is "problematic", and that "3 and 4 imply 1" [but weren't they supposed to be "distinct"?], so we discover, with some relief, that "[t]his leaves only options 2 and options 5-9".
If we examine them closely, at least some of the "nine options" are, if not the same in other words, certainly overlapping, as DT admits ("the claims are related to each other in various ways").
[page 79 – position 823] As with Paul, we are to believe in one God and in one Lord.
As already noted elsewhere, DT is happily oblivious that to attribute the title of Lord ONLY to Jesus (eis kyrios - as Paul undoubtedly does at 1 Cor 8:6) is simply incompatible with Deut 6:4 where God is declared to be "One LORD" (kyrios eis - in the LXX Greek).
[page 81 – position 842] Thus, they [the bishops at Nicea, 325] seem to commit not only to option 8, but also to option 2.
It is not at all clear how "similar beings" (opt. 8) would share the "same universal essence" (op. 2)
[page 81 – position 842] Presumably, they don’t mean the Son to be “true God” using those words non-literally.
To affirm that "they" [the Conciliar Fathers] "don't mean the son to be 'true God", when that is precisely what they affirm, in the Nicene Creed of 325, would mean to attribute them, without warrant, serious mental reserve and duplicity.
[page 82 – position 851] But this view [of some earlier catholics like Tertullian] of God and the other members of the triad as material beings had been vigorously opposed by the leading teacher Origen.
This quibble whether it is appropriate to refer to God's ousia as a "spiritual sort of matter" is worthy of the most consummate finicky theological hair-splitters.
[page 82 – position 856] But these bishops probably also assumed that anything composed of matter was subject to change, whereas God was unchangeable. And given the influence of Platonism, and its assumption that the ultimate reality is utterly simple, without parts or different components in any sense, I don’t suppose that most of them would have thought the Father has any sort of matter at all.
See above comment.
[page 83 – position 863] How, then, is this anti-Arian Nicene creed [of 325] monotheistic? Their statement features two “Gods,” that is, two who are each called “God” and “true God.” By itself, this is compatible with monotheism. Monotheism is the claim that there’s only one god, not the claim that only one being can be properly addressed or described as “a god” or “God” or even “true God.”
DT seems to be blissfully oblivious that the only way to make compatible this question ("How is this anti-Arian Nicene creed monotheistic?") and the relative answer ("Monotheism is the claim that there is only one God") is to go straight to the Cappadocian ploy of "one ousia and [two or] three hypostases". OR to the solution of Marcellus of Ancyra ...
[page 83 – position 868] They [the bishops at Nicea 325] seem to be implying that the Father is a god, and the Son is another god.
This is precisely the "original sin" of Justin Martyr: “another God and Lord” (Gr. theos kai kurios eteros).
[page 83 – position 871] Pray for us all that our decisions may remain secure through almighty God and our lord Jesus Christ in the holy Spirit, to whom is the glory for ever and ever.
[page 86 – position 898] Again, Marcellus was at the 325 council and may have been influential there.
DT says repeatedly, about Marcellus of Ancyra's role at the Council of Nicea 325, that he may have been "possibly influential", that he "may have been influential". More than a "possibility", this is a certainly: see Marcellus of Ancyra and the Councils of AD 325: Antioch, Ancyra, and Nicaea, Alastair H. B. Logan, The Journal of Theological Studies, Volume 43, Issue 2, 1 October 1992, Pages 428–446.
[page 86 – position 900] Many associated Marcellus with the 325 creed, and in their eyes both were basically latter-day versions monarchian heresy. Eventually, Marcellus’s distinctive take on John 1 was condemned by both Western and Eastern councils, and he probably modified his views away from monarchianism.
DT provides no support for his claim that Marcellus "probably modified his views", nor that “Marcellus’s distinctive take on John 1 was condemned by both Western and Eastern councils”. That his views would have consisted in "monarchianism" (Sabellianism) is a slander by Eusebius of Caesarea.
[page 87 – position 909] Some critics of Nicea also thought they detected a whiff of our material interpretations (5 or 6) in that creed [Nicea 325], in its newfangled assertion that the Son (logos) was begotten (i.e. eternally generated) from God’s “substance,” which might mean his stuff or matter.
This would certainly weaken DT's claim that his "different options", and in particular 2 ("same universal essence"), 5 ("same kind of matter") and 6 ("same portion of matter") are so "different" as DT claims.
[page 87 – position 914] The “second god,” the Word, is in a sense divine, but is not great enough to be an additional god. In contrast, the miahypostatic theologians made sure that the logos was not a second deity by making clear that he’s not a being in his own right. He’s just the Father, the one God, acting in certain ways.
For the affirmation, attributed to miahypostatic theology that the logos is "just the Father, the one God, acting in certain ways", see previous criticism. Again, for miahypostatic theology, the logos is an eternal, essential attribute of the One and Only God. Otherwise Eusebius of Caesarea, and also others, would be right in claiming that “both [Marcellus and the homousios of Nicea] were basically latter-day versions monarchian heresy”.
[page 88 – position 921] Miahypostatic theologians could read this creed in accordance with their theory that the eternal, uncreated Word is in eternity an attribute, and then an action of God. Preacher Man is just as human as Martin Luther King Jr. Just so, this Word may be understood as divine, because it’s just God acting to create and redeem.
Here DT spectacularly oscillates between referring to the Word as an "attribute" (of the One and Only God), but then as a mere "action" of the same God. All ad majorem unitarianismi gloriam ...
[page 88 – position 928] Isn’t radical independence of anything else (later called aseity) a divine attribute?
Interestingly, John Calvin, a staunch advocate of absolutely egalitarian Trinity, refused to subscribe to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. He was a staunch defender of the aseity of the Son, whom he went as far as calling autotheos (“self-god”).
[page 89 – position 937] Its main thrust is the similarity of the Word and God, and this is seemingly a matter of their having one universal essence.
Presumably DT is speaking here of the series of Arian and semi-Arian "creeds" that were written between 325 and 381 (see A Chronology of the Arian Controversy, @ legalhistorysources.com). DT seems to minimize the import of the homoousios, oblivious that there was a true and proper battle between the Nicene advocates of the straight homoousios and the Arian advocates of the diluted homoiousios.
[page 90 – position 950] This [Constantinople 381] is the first really trinitarian (Trin[i]ty-implying) catholic creed.
DT, again, refuses to consider that, after Justin Martyr's "original sin" of “another God and Lord” (Gr. theos kai kurios eteros) the only other way to affirm the Biblical Oneness of God, (other than the fully fledged co-eternal, co-equal, tri-personal Trinity), was to affirm, with Marcellus, that the Word/logos/dabar and the Spirit/pneuma/ruach are essential attributes of the One and Only God, the Father Almighty.
[page 91 – position 965] What is a “Person” if not a certain being? How then can Father and Son and Spirit be different “Persons” while being the same being? Hasn’t it just been implied that the “three” of them are really one and the same, numerically one, one ousia in the sense of our option 1 above? If so, how could “they” eternally differ from one another? Wouldn’t this amount to a single entity in eternity being and not being the same way? Isn’t that impossible? And how can God be both triune and utterly simple, that is, devoid of parts, and of any sort of inner complexity?
Augustine, though, uses the term persona rather vaguely, so much so that, in his De Trinitate, he says that the personae are "three somethings" (tria quaedam), in order to “say something rather than nothing” about the threeness in God.
[page 92 – position 971] In recent times analytic philosophers have suggested that Father and Son can be the same god without being the same being/entity (that is, without being numerically identical). Some, for philosophical reasons we can’t go into here, dismiss our concerns about option 1, and a few others now stump for trinitarianism now being understood in sense 6 above, where the members of the trinity share one portion of something like matter, whatever may have been meant in 325 or 381.
This is best expressed in the common summation of the Trinity as "one what in three whos", which, though, underlines that god, the "what", is not essentially personal.
[page 94 – position 979] Perhaps a good Christian ought not presume to understand the formulas at all, but should only humbly receive and repeat them, embracing the Trinity as a holy “mystery.”
In my opinion, the only coherent analogy/interpretation of the "one substance in three persons" is the one devised by William Craig Lane and J. P. Moreland, viz. that of three triplets sharing the same body and having three distinct heads.
8 Mystery Mountain
[page 101 – position 1057] One may mean that the Trinity doctrine is apparently self-contradictory (incoherent), and not just at first glance, but whenever one thinks long and hard about it. Like our imagined guru Opi, they won’t and can’t tell us where there is any equivocation in trinitarian sentences, so that they may turn out to be coherent after all.
With his little "analogical apologue" of "Opi the dopi", DT shoes that his main concern with the doctrine(s) of the Trinity is whether it is (are) coherent (self-consistent) or not, rather than whether it can be found in and founded on the Bible. Which, for someone who boasts his belonging to the Protestant field, is rather strange.
[page 106 – position 1117] Some will object that surely God loves to humble us. He assaults our pride by revealing what can’t be understood, forcing us to trust in him, and to walk away from the demands of our sinful, damaged minds.
Apparently DT subscribes literally to the doctrine of "original sin", which would have damaged "human nature".
[page 106 – position 1122] I’d like the mysterian to tell us just where scripture says that God actually does this [reveals something incoherent], as it seems like something a perfect being wouldn’t do.
Here is a "propositional argument" for Dale Tuggy, who very often resorts to them.
1. Jesus tells us that God is good, in fact "No one is good except God alone". (Mk 10:18; Lk 18:19)
2. God, in the OT does horrible things, like insisting on exterminating women, children and even animals. (see, e.g. 1 Sam 15:3)
3. The goodness of God is either questionable, or incompatible with any human standard. (1, 2)
Maybe a mysterian will bow down in awe, but I don't see how any "analytic theologian" can put 3 right.
[page 109 – position 1141] You must retreat to 4, and spend most of your time there, camping at the base.
DT's chart with 4 stations is neither a full picture, nor a genuinely biblical one. Consider the illustration al p. 108, pos. 1134:
P2: Jesus is God himself
P3 (not-P): It is not the case that Jesus is God himself
P1: (P2 x P3): Jesus is God himself AND It is not the case that Jesus is God himself
P4: It is impossible to decide whether P2 OR P1 OR (P2 x P3)
Does the above exhaust the possibilities? Nope, here are few that, unlike the above, are straight from the NT:
P5: God's Logos is God (John 1:1)
P6: Jesus is the incarnation of God's Logos (John 1:14)
P7: For in Him dwells all the fullness of the Deity bodily (Col 2:9)
P8: When the Helper comes, whom I will send to you from the Father (John 15:26)
P9: The Father is greater than I (John 14:28)
P10: I am the Son of God (John 10:36)
Conclusions?
P11: Jesus is equal to God inasmuch as he is the incarnation of God's Logos (P5, P6, P7), and also promises to send the Spirit from the Father (P8)
P12: Jesus is lower than God because he explicitly says so (P9) and corrects the Jews who accuse him of making himself equal to God (P10)
9 What’s a “God”?
[page 113 – position 1177] Let us again count the options.
It is useful to see all DT's options of what different people understand "God" to be: 1. God the idea; 2. God the something-or-other; 3. God the group of selves; 4. God the god, the divine self.
[page 116 – position 1218] The main Hebrew term for this is elohim, which is plural in form, but which can be singular or plural in meaning, like the English word “pants.” [sic!] One decides whether it is being used as singular or plural by looking at the other words in the sentence, such as verbs and adjectives. A ghost is an elohim, an angel is an elohim, and the members of God’s court are elohim. 121 Even certain powerful humans can be described, non-literally, as elohim, “gods.” 122 Yahweh too is an elohim, a god, although unique among them. 123
This is a caricature of how the word god (God) is expressed in Biblical Hebrew.
- The basic word is 'el (mn, pl. 'elim), used 245 times, of which 213 to refer to God. It may also mean mighty man, angel, (heathen) god, or, generically, power, even in nature.
- 'elowah (mn) is a prolonged (emphatic) form derived from 'el. It is used 57 times, of which 52 for God and 5 for (false) gods.
- 'elohiym is the plural of 'elowah. As proper plural, it is used for rulers, judges, divine beings, angels, (false) gods. As intensive plural (with singular meaning and verb), it can be used generically for a god, but predominantly (2346 out of 2606 occurrences) for the One and Only God, YHWH.
[page 122 – position 1270] Ancient bigshots of theology such as Origen and Tertullian are on the Father-as-the-one-God side.
Again and again, DT meddles with theological definitions by putting in his idiosyncratically defined Unitarian camp not only proper Unitarians like Socinus, for whom Jesus is only a man (at most miraculously born by God's Spirit - or spirit? - from the Virgin Mary), but also Subordinationists like Tertullian and Origen, for whom Jesus is the Son, a second hypostasis, even "eternally generated" by the Father. All ad majorem unitarianismi gloriam ...
10 Says Who?
[page 123 – position 1280] In practice, though, many Protestant theologians regard the decisions of the ancient “ecumenical” councils (the first seven recognized by Catholic and Orthodox traditions) as inviolable.
The title of a recent podcast/post at DT's blog (Trinities - http://trinities.org/blog), “podcast 189 – The unfinished business of the Reformation”, seemed promising, suggesting that, while mainstream Protestantism refused to confront the doctrine of the Trinity (in fact Martin Luther violently attacked anti-trinitarian theologian Michael Servetus, and John Calvin even had him burned at the stake in Geneva in 1553), it is now time to debunk the Trinity. Unfortunately, the title was totally misleading ...
[page 126 – position 1314] And isn’t this “angel of Yahweh” in fact the pre-human Jesus?
That the expression "angel of Yahweh" (mal'ak YHWH) would refer to the "pre-human Jesus" is a most arbitrary claim of some theologians on the OT.
[page 129 – position 1341] The other two are called “God” because of their similarity to and derivation from him.
The point is not whether the "other two" (Logos and Spirit) are "similar" to the One God, but whether they are personal entities (of course, then, subordinated) or, instead, attributes of the One God. Once their personal character is affirmed, even if subordinated, under the constraint of Biblical Monotheism, the only consistent solution is the fully fledged Trinity, even if it is neither found in the Bible, nor founded on it.
[page 129 – position 1347] I don’t think there is any argument of the above sort which shows how the New Testament implies the Trinity.
Again, the question is not whether the NT "implies the Trinity", but the abusive attribution to the Logos and Spirit of a personal pre-existent nature.
[page 130 – position 1352] It was all, unbeknownst to first-century people, heading towards the culminating declarations of the councils, just as unbeknownst to the ancient Jews, it was all heading towards the ministry of a self-sacrificing Messiah.
Again, what led inevitably to the Trinity of the end of the fourth century is not the NT revelation, but the "original sin" of the affirmation by Justin Martyr of "another God and Lord" (Gr. theos kai kurios eteros).
[page 130 – position 1359] Some sophisticated theologians have retreated from the claim that it is implied there [in the Bible], to the claim that trinitarian theology best explains what is and is not said there. In so doing, they recognize that trinitarian ideas are foreign imports which the latter-day reader brings back to the ancient scriptures in order to better understand them, and not something discovered in the texts themselves.
A fancy word to describe this "import" is eis-egesis, formed by derivation from and opposition to ex-egesis.
[page 131 – position 1374] About the “ecumenical” councils, do you agree that they are authoritative for any disciple of Jesus?
The role of Church is to be an authoritative witness, through the ages, of "the faith which was once for all delivered to the saints" (Jude 1:3). All the rest is not mandatory but, at best useful, sometimes indifferent and often simply arbitrary.
[page 132 – position 1383] I agree with T2 [“The Bible is the only authoritative tradition”], not because the bishops ratified that exact collection of books, but rather because at least most of the New Testament comes from the apostles and their immediate circles, those directly taught by the Lord Jesus, and those directly taught by them.
However much DT tries to insist, from his Protestant POV, there is little doubt that the Bible is the ultimate source of authority for any Christian doctrine precisely "because the bishops ratified that exact collection of books". As it is known to (nearly) everybody, some books were not accepted without dispute. Among them, foremost are Revelation and even the Gospel of John.
[page 136 – position 1401] Does the New Testament make catholic bishops the successors of the apostles, with apostle-level authority to settle questions of Christian doctrine, working together in official, emperor-convened councils?
Of course the answer to this question depends entirely on what is considered to be the ultimate source of authority: for Catholics it is Bible and Tradition, for Protestants it is "Bible only". My answer to the question is yes, with an addition and with restrictions. I consider the Apostolic Symbol (that I identify essentially with the Old Roman Creed - vetus symbolum romanum) of genuine Apostolic origin. Any "question of Christian doctrine" should be examined and settled based on whether it has a positive foundation in the Bible and/or in the Apostolic Symbol. For instance, the doctrine of the logos is definitely present, and sufficiently clear, in the Prologue to the Gospel of John (and, to some extent, in the beginning of the First Letter of John), but it is not present in the Apostolic Symbol (nor, for that matter, in any historic Creed). On the other hand, the doctrine of the Trinity (but also its subordinationist precedent) are present neither in the Bible nor in the Apostolic Symbol. Consequently I deny that the assembled Bishops have the right to decide for all Christians on this matter.
Epilogue
[page 137 – position 1425] Suppose I agree that the one God is the Father. What, then, does that make Jesus? What is his precise status? Is he divine, and if so, in what sense?
The answer to these questions is essential, if there ever is any hope of overcoming the divide between Christians and Jews, and also Muslims.
[page 137 – position 1427] What should a Christian believe about Jesus? A simple answer is: all that the New Testament explicitly says about him. He’s God’s Messiah, the Son of Man, the unique Son of God, the “lamb of God” who takes away the sins of the world, the risen and exalted “Lord” who now sits at God’s right hand and serves as a high priest between us and the one who is our God and his God.
It sticks out like a sore thumb that DT has omitted from his list of positive NT affirmations about Jesus, his being the incarnation of God's eternal logos (John 1:1,14).
[page 138 – position 1435] It goes far beyond simple talk of him as “God and man” or as “the Godman,” or even just that he has “two natures,” a divine and a human one.
That word, "beyond", is one that philosophers and theologians (and also politicians) use when they want to avoid delving in a serious question, usually dismissed as "simple talk". Nevertheless, even DT speaks openly of the question of the "deity of Christ", as distinct, nay opposed to the question of the Trinity.
